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Abstract
Deep neural networks are easily fooled by small perturbations
known as adversarial attacks. Adversarial Training (AT) is a
technique aimed at learning features robust to such attacks
and is widely regarded as a very effective defense. However,
the computational cost of such training can be prohibitive as
the network size and input dimensions grow. Inspired by the
relationship between robustness and curvature, we propose a
novel regularizer which incorporates first and second order
information via a quadratic approximation to the adversar-
ial loss. The worst case quadratic loss is approximated via
an iterative scheme. It is shown that using only a single it-
eration in our regularizer achieves stronger robustness than
prior gradient and curvature regularization schemes, avoids
gradient obfuscation, and, with additional iterations, achieves
strong robustness with significantly lower training time than
AT. Further, it retains the interesting facet of AT that networks
learn features which are well-aligned with human perception.
We demonstrate experimentally that our method produces
higher quality human-interpretable features than other geo-
metric regularization techniques. These robust features are
then used to provide human-friendly explanations to model
predictions.
Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNN) are powerful models that have
achieved excellent performance across various domains (Le-
Cun, Bengio, and Hinton 2015) by exploiting hierarchi-
cal representations of data. As these models are being de-
ployed across industries, such as healthcare and autonomous
driving, robustness and interpretability concerns become in-
creasingly important. Several organizations have also have
identified important principles of artificial intelligence (AI)
that include notions of reliability and transparency (Pichai
2018; Microsoft 2019; Lopez 2020).
One issues of such large capacity models is that small,
carefully chosen input perturbations, known as adversar-
ial perturbations, can lead to incorrect predictions (Good-
fellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2015). Various enhancement
methods have been proposed to defend against adversar-
ial perturbations (Kurakin, Goodfellow, and Bengio 2017;
Ros and Doshi-Velez 2018; Madry et al. 2018; Moosavi-
Dezfooli et al. 2019). One of the best performing algo-
rithms is adversarial training (AT) (Madry et al. 2018),
∗Authors have made equal contributions.
which defends against strong adversarial perturbations by
attacking the model during training. Computing these ad-
versarial perturbations at each step of AT requires many it-
erations of a gradient-based optimization to be performed
for each new minibatch. This becomes computationally pro-
hibitive as the model size and input dimensions grow. Train-
ing against weaker attacks can reduce this cost but leads
to strong robustness against weak attacks and brittleness
against stronger attacks. This can be due to gradient ob-
fuscation (Uesato et al. 2018; Athalye, Carlini, and Wag-
ner 2018), a phenomena where networks learn to defend
against gradient-based attacks by making the loss landscape
highly non-linear. Another sign of gradient obfuscation is
when adversarial attacks computed with a few iterations fail
but black-box attacks successfully find adversarial perturba-
tions (Uesato et al. 2018; Guo et al. 2019).
Another major concern is interpretability of DNN deci-
sions and explanation methods for AI system users or stake-
holders. Insights into model behavior based on counterfac-
tual explanations has the potential to be be very useful for
users (Wachter, Mittelstadt, and Russell 2018). However,
standard networks do not have interpretable saliency maps
and adversarial attacks tend to be visually imperceptible.
Some popular explanation methods include layerwise rele-
vance propagation (LRP) (Bach et al. 2015), locally inter-
pretable model-agnostic explanations (Ribeiro, Singh, and
Guestrin 2016), and contrastive explanations (Dhurandhar
et al. 2019), but these methods only yield feature relevance
and are susceptible to spurious correlations prevalent in stan-
dard networks (Ilyas et al. 2019). The relationship between
adversarial robustness and saliency map interpretability was
recently studied in (Etmann et al. 2019) but experiments
were based on gradient regularization. Furthermore, recent
works (Tsipras et al. 2019; Ilyas et al. 2019) claim that ex-
istence of adversarial examples are due to standard train-
ing methods that rely on highly predictive but non-robust
features, and make connections between robustness and ex-
plainability.
In this paper, we propose a quadratic-approximation of
adversarial attacks that we incorporate into a regularizer
which smooths the loss landscape and yields adversarial ro-
bustness. This smoothness implies that, in a neighborhood
of a point x, the loss landscape is well approximated by gra-
dient and curvature information. Our models avoid gradi-
ar
X
iv
:2
00
9.
04
92
3v
1 
 [c
s.L
G]
  1
0 S
ep
 20
20
ent obfuscation by exploiting this information. We refer to
this second-order robust optimization approach as SCOR-
PIO. We empirically show that networks trained with the
SCORPIO regularizer combat gradient obfuscation and re-
tain a high level of robustness against various types of strong
attacks. Furthermore, we show how these networks improve
interpretability and can be used to explain DNN predictions
using a framework inspired by (Dhurandhar et al. 2019; Ilyas
et al. 2019). Our main contributions are summarized below:
• A new regularizer is proposed (that may be adapted for
any Lp norm) with minimal tuning parameters based
on projection-free Frank-Wolfe iterations on a local
quadratic-approximation to the adversarial risk that incor-
porates second-order information.
• It is shown that the SCORPIO regularizer trains faster
than AT, provides robustness nearly on the same level as
AT, and outperforms prior gradient and curvature regular-
izers when evaluated under various types of strong white-
box attacks.
• It is demonstrated experimentally that SCORPIO better
protects models against some black-box attacks than AT,
suggesting that SCORPIO suffers from less gradient ob-
fuscation than AT.
• It is shown that the quadratic-approximate attacks are still
successful against robust models.
• It is shown that the quality of saliency maps and adversar-
ial perturbations improves for the SCORPIO regularizer.
Background and Previous Work
Consider (xi, yi) ∼ D pairs of data examples drawn from
distribution D. The labels are assumed to span K classes.
The neural network function fθ(·) maps input features into
logits, where θ are the model parameters. The class proba-
bility scores are obtained using the softmax transformation
pk(x) = e
fθ,k(x)/
∑
l e
fθ,l(x). The predicted class label is
given by yˆ(x) = argmaxk fθ,k(x).
The prevalent way of training classifiers is through empir-
ical risk minimization (ERM):
min
θ
E(x,y)∼D[`(x, y; θ)]
where the loss is the cross-entropy loss function given by
`(fθ(x), y) = `(x, y; θ) = −yT log(pθ(x)), where y de-
notes the one-hot label vector.
Adversarial robustness for a classifier fθ is defined with
respect to a metric, here chosen as the Lp metric associated
with the ball Bp() = {δ :‖ δ ‖p≤ }, as follows. A net-
work is said to be robust to adversarial perturbations of size
 at a given input example x iff yˆ(x) = yˆ(x + δ) for all
δ ∈ Bp(), i.e., if the predicted label does not change for all
perturbations of size up to . The  is often referred to as the
strength or budget of the attack.
Training neural networks using the ERM principle gives
high accuracy on test sets, but leaves the network vulnera-
ble to adversarial attacks. One of the most effective defenses
against such attacks is adversarial training (AT) (Madry et al.
2018) which aims to minimize the adversarial risk instead,
min
θ
E(x,y)∼D
[
max
δ∈Bp()
`(x+ δ, y; θ)
]
. (1)
The training procedure constructs adversarial attacks at
given inputs x that aim to solve the inner maximization prob-
lem. Common maximization methods typically use a fixed
number of gradient-ascent optimizations. One such method
is projected gradient descent (PGD) that performs the itera-
tive updates:
δ(k+1) = PBp()(δ
(k) + α∇δ`(x+ δ, y; θ)) (2)
where PBp()(z) = argminu∈Bp() ‖ z − u ‖22 denotes the
orthogonal projection onto the constraint set. The sign of the
gradient has also been shown to be an effective perturbation.
The computational cost of this method is dominated by the
number of steps used to approximate the inner maximiza-
tion, since an N step PGD approximation to the maximiza-
tion (denoted PGD(N )) involvesN forward-backward prop-
agations through the network. While using fewer PGD steps
can lower this cost, these amount to weaker attacks which
can lead to gradient obfuscation (Papernot et al. 2017; Ue-
sato et al. 2018).
Prior works on regularization for adversarial robustness
include gradient (Lyu, Huang, and Liang 2015; Ros and
Doshi-Velez 2018) and curvature based penalties (Moosavi-
Dezfooli et al. 2019). Gradient methods have not been
shown to yield good robustness against strong attacks, while
the relationship between small curvature and high robust-
ness has been better established, but still leaves significant
room for improvement. Based on the connection between
curvature and robustness, a regularizer that promotes local
linearity near training examples was proposed in (Qin et al.
2019) which is based on minimizing an upper bound on the
adversarial risk via several PGD steps. These methods argue
that flattening the decision boundary via the loss is a suitable
defense against adversarial attacks.
Approximating the Adversarial Attack
For this section we suppress the explicit dependence on the
network and target and let `(x) := `(fθ(x), y). Rather than
approximate the maximization of (1) directly first define
quadratic-approximate risk function
Q(v;x) := ∇x`(x) · v + 1
2
vT∇2x`(x)v (3)
and then propose solving the quadratic approximate risk op-
timization problem,
vQ = argmax
|v|p≤
Q(v;x). (4)
Intuitively, we expect this quadratic approximate loss, `(x+
vQ) to play the role of the adversarial risk, and vQ to play
that of an attack.
In order to compare the quadratic-approximate attack and
the adversarial attack we let
vA = argmax
v∈Bp()
`(x+ v)
be the optimal adversarial attack and define LA = `(x+vA)
and LQ = `(x + vQ) to be the corresponding worst case
adversarial-loss and the worst case quadratic-approximate
loss, respectively. The following theorem gives bounds on
these two losses in terms of the regularity of the loss, and so
implicitly the network.
Theorem 1. Let LA and LQ be the worst case adversarial
loss and worst case quadratic-approximate loss at some x
over Bp(). If ` ◦ fθ ∈ C3(Bp()) then
|LA−LQ| ≤ 2‖∇x`(x)‖q+22‖∇2x`(x)‖p,q+
3M
3
(5)
where M is the supremum-norm of all derivatives of `(x) of
order three, over Bp().
It is important here to emphasize the implications of The-
orem 1. The amount by which the quadratic-approximate at-
tack is either stronger or weaker than a full adversarial at-
tack is controlled by the strength of the attack and by the reg-
ularity of the network. The advantage of using the quadratic-
approximate attack is that the optimization (4) can be well
approximated with less computation complexity than stan-
dard AT.
For L2 attacks larger attack strengths, , can still result
in imperceptible changes to the input. However, L∞ attacks
are considered stronger attacks since they can deceive a net-
work using a smaller strength perturbation, and so modify
the input in a less perceptible way. Theorem 1 suggests that
the gap between the two attacks should be smaller in the L∞
case than L2. This is demonstrated experimentally below.
It has been shown experimentally that many robust mod-
els, including AT and the geometric-regularization methods
mentioned above, have the more regular loss landscapes than
their non-robust counterparts (Lyu, Huang, and Liang 2015;
Ros and Doshi-Velez 2018; Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. 2019;
Qin et al. 2019). Theorem 1 implies that greater regular-
ity of the network, and thus its decision boundary, will re-
sult in a smaller gap between the quadratic approximate risk
and the adversarial risk. This suggests that the quadratic ap-
proximate attacks, vQ, should fool robust models at similar
rates to PGD attacks. However, standard non-robust models
can be much less regular, suggesting quadratic-approximate
attacks will not perform as well as min-max attacks. We
demonstrate this phenomena experimentally below.
The new approximate attack into the loss via a regularizer
that penalizes deviation from the original prediction
`Q = `(x+ vQ)− `(x). (6)
Since `Q = Q(vQ)+Rx,3(vQ), adding it as a regularizer in-
corporates both gradient and curvature terms not explicitly
exploited by AT. Further it does this without directly com-
puting these derivatives, as done in gradient and curvature
regularizations, which can lead to expensive backprop steps
during training.
Finding the Optimal Approximate Attack
Let vk be the approximate solution to (4) at step k, g =
∇x`(x), and H = ∇2x`(x). A good initialization for the it-
eration is v0 = g/ ‖ g ‖p, since this maximizes the inner
product term; moreover, it has been demonstrated experi-
mentally that the gradient direction is well aligned with the
direction of maximum curvature of neural networks (Jetley,
Lord, and Torr 2018; Fawzi et al. 2018) so v0 also serves as
a strong initialization for the curvature term vTHv.
An obvious first choice would be projected gradient de-
cent as is done in AT, but instead of optimizing the adver-
sarial risk we would optimize (3). However, this method in-
volves tuning the step size α, and we experimentally found
that it provided less robustness than the next approach for
the same number of steps.
For these reasons we use a Frank-Wolfe (FW) iteration,
(Jaggi 2013). This method first solves a linearized version
of the problem over convex sets,s
k := argmax
‖s‖p≤
s · ∇vQ(vk)
vk+1 := (1− γk)vk + γksk
(7)
where γk = 2/(2 + k) is the step size. The FW sub-
problem can be solved exactly for any Lp and the optimal
sk = PFW (v
k; p) is given by
PFW (v
k; p) = α · sgn(∇vQ(vk)i) |∇vQ(vk)i|p/q (8)
with α chosen so that ‖ sk ‖p= .
Note FW does not require a projection onto the Lp ball
which is non-trivial for p not in {1, 2, ∞}. Another advan-
tage of FW is the γk do not need to be tuned. Interestingly,
for the special case of L∞ attacks the optimal solution be-
comes the signed gradient of the quadratic approximation,
i.e. sk =  sgn(∇vQ(vk)). This suggests a connection to the
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) of adversarial attacks,
(Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2015).
Proposition 1. If v0 = g and H is positive-semi-definite
then the sequence of vk defined by (7) is a non-decreasing
sequence for Q. That is for all k ≥ 0
Q(vk) ≥ Q(vk−1) ≥ . . . ≥ 0.
The condition that the Hessian of the loss, H , be positive
semi-definite has been shown to hold locally for all x, ex-
cluding a set of measure 0, when the network uses ReLU
activations and the loss is categorical cross entropy (Singla
et al. 2019).
Computational Complexity
At each iteration of FW the gradient of the quadratic approx-
imate risk are required. The term
∇vQ(v) = ∇x`(x) +∇2x`(x)v (9)
requires a Hessian vector product. We note that use of this
gradient into (7) incorporates first- and second-order loss in-
formation into each iteration. One can compute the Hessian
vector product in 1 forward and 2 backward passes. How-
ever, computing backward passes during training is expen-
sive. Further, it was noted in (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. 2019)
that using highly localized curvature information conferred
less robustness to the model and using a finite difference
with relatively large step sizes allowed the network to reg-
ularize the loss curvature in a neighborhood of the sample
point. For these reasons we propose using two approxima-
tions to the Hessian vector product. First, the Forward Euler
(FE) approximation
∇2x`(x)v ≈
[∇x`(x+ hv)−∇x`(x)]
h
(10)
and the Central Difference (CD) approximation
∇2x`(x)v ≈
[∇x`(x+ hv)−∇x`(x− hv)]
2h
. (11)
Naively, computing (9) with either finite difference costs
three forward and one backward pass; however, the gradient
at x can be computed once and in the case of FE it can be
recycled to be used into the finite-difference term. The cost
of an N -iteration FW is then N + 1 forward and backward
passes for FE and 2N + 1 for CD. The FW-FE algorithm
with gradient recycling is given in Algorithm 1.
In our experiments we show that even for N = 3 both
FE- and CD-SCORPIO, costing 4 and 7 forward-backward
passes respectively, achieve nearly the same robustness as
PGD(10)-AT which costs 10 forward-backward passes.
Note that if sufficient memory is available CD can be fur-
ther optimized by parallelizing the computation of the for-
ward pass of x ± hv allowing modern deep learning frame-
works on GPU hardware to parallelize the majority of the
computations. In practice on CIFAR-10 and SVHN with
batch sizes of 512 we see little difference in the FE and CD
training times.
Algorithm 1: Forward Euler Frank Wolfe (FE-FW) ap-
plied to a neural network fθ, at an input x0 with corre-
sponding target y0 and a loss `.
Input : N ,, h, p
Output: Approximate solution, v∗, to (4).
1 l0 = `(fθ(x0), y0)
2 g0 = grad[l0, x0]
3 v∗ ← g0
4 for k ∈ {0, ..., N − 1} do
5 γk = 2/(2 + k)
6 lk = `(fθ(x0 + hv∗), y0 )
7 gk = grad[lk, x0]
8 sk =  ∗ PFW (g0 + 1h (gk − g0); p )
9 v∗ ← (1− γk)v∗ + γksk
10 end
Experimental Results
We evaluate the performance of our proposed SCORPIO
regularizer against standard networks, gradient regularizered
networks (Grad-Reg) (Ros and Doshi-Velez 2018), curva-
ture regularized networks (CURE) (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al.
2019), and adversarial training (AT) (Madry et al. 2018).
Implementation
The models, training, and evaluation routines for our exper-
iments were performed using the robustness library from
(Engstrom et al. 2019) which we modified to to support
the SVHN dataset. Experiments were run on 2 Volta V100
GPUs using the computing resources at (Computing cred-
its censored to maintain anonymity).
Hyperparameters were tuned for each experiment with the
goal of achieving near the clean accuracy of AT. For SCOR-
PIO models, the finite difference step size h and regulariza-
tion strength r were tuned via a manual search for both be-
tween 0.5 and 1.5. For tuning CURE, grad-reg, we chose the
regularization strength to be as large as possible while still
nearly matching the clean accuracy of AT. For AT we ran
PGD with 10 steps and chose the best model that achieves
the highest adversarial accuracy at  = 0.5 for L2 robustness
and  = 8/255.0 for L∞ robustness. Specifics can be found
in the supplementary materials.
Adversarial Robustness
To test the robustness of our network, we consider a vari-
ety of adversarial attacks, including untargeted and targeted
attacks towards a random class r ∼ Unif({1, . . . ,K}\y).
The classification margin is defined as:
M(x, y) = log py(x)−max
j 6=y
log pj(x) (12)
The following loss functions are used to obtain low adver-
sarial accuracy:
(UL) Untargeted-loss: maxδ∈B() l(x+ δ, y)
(TL) Rand.Targeted-loss: maxδ∈B() l(x+ δ, r)
(UM) Untargeted-margin: minδ∈B()M(x+ δ, y)
(TM) Rand. Targeted-margin: maxδ∈B()M(x+ δ, r)
The performance metric used is the accuracy on the test
set after the attack is applied, i.e., adversarial accuracy. We
empirically observed that the margin-based attacks on ro-
bust models are stronger than loss-based attacks for robust
models.
On CIFAR-10 SCORPIO outperforms both Grad-Reg and
CURE by a sizable margin and achieves robustness close to
that of AT for increasingly strong attacks. The gap between
SCORPIO and AT is smaller for the L∞ case than the L2,
see Figure 1a and 1b. In Table 2a and 2b we report results
for the specific attacks in the L2 and L∞ case, respectively.
In general untargeted attacks are stronger than targeted and
margin attacks are stronger then loss based ones. For all at-
tacks the trend holds that SCORPIO outperforms the geo-
metric regularizers and is close to AT.
The SVHN dataset followed the same trends. In all cases
SCORPIO outperforms Grad-Reg and CURE and is close
to, sometimes better than, AT. see Figure 1c and 1d and sup-
plemental tables 7a and 7b for details.
Approximate Quadratic Attacks
For these experiments we compare L2 PGD adversarial at-
tacks on the loss against the quadratic-approximate attacks
obtained by approximating solutions to (4). We compute ad-
versarial attacks using N = 10 PGD steps and approxi-
mate the quadratic-approximate attacks with N = 3 steps
of Frank-Wolfe (FE). We see for models with smoother
Method Clean PGD(10) PGD(20) PGD(40) PGD(100)
SCORPIO (FE,N=1) 89.42 66.35 66.06 65.98 65.97
SCORPIO (CD,N=1) 88.16 66.03 65.83 65.74 65.72
Adv Train (PGD-3) 87.62 63.19 62.89 62.81 62.81
Table 1: Model accuracy on CIFAR-10 test set for untargeted marging (UM) based adversarial L2 PGD attacks on the margin at
 = 0.5 for robust networks trained against L2 adversary. The step size for PGD was set to α = 0.1. Both methods are trained
starting from pretrained standard networks with fine-tuning. Our proposed regularizer, SCORPIO, with one FW step N = 1,
outperforms the PGD-based adversarial training with N = 3 steps.
(a) CIFAR10 L2 robustness. (b) CIFAR10 L∞ robustness.
(c) SVHN L2 robustness. (d) SVHN L∞ robustness.
Figure 1: Adversarial accuracy as a function of  on CIFAR-
10 (a,b) and SVHN (c,d) test set. Adversarial attacks on the
loss using PGD(10) were used for evaluating robustness. We
observe SCORPIO-FE(3) achieves nearly the same robust-
ness levels as adversarial training with PGD(10) adversary
and outperforms gradient and curvature regularizers by a
large margin.
Method Clean UL TL UM TM
Standard 94.5 6.9 27.3 6.6 29.4
Gradient Reg 89.2 32.3 70.2 32.2 66.9
CURE 88.3 54.6 81.5 53.7 79.5
SCORPIO (FE,N=3) 88.7 66.9 85.3 66.8 83.8
SCORPIO (CD,N=3) 89.9 66.4 85.4 66.2 83.8
Adv Train (PGD-10) 89.0 68.8 85.4 68.8 84.6
(a) L2 adversarial PGD(10) attacks with loss / margin at  = 0.5
Method Clean UL TL UM TM
Standard 94.5 0.2 13.2 0.3 14.4
Gradient Reg 82.5 6.5 40.0 7.1 34.8
CURE 81.1 23.0 60.7 22.4 54.3
SCORPIO (FE,N=3) 82.7 50.5 75.2 48.7 73.0
SCORPIO (CD,N=3) 83.3 49.2 74.6 47.2 71.9
Adv Train (PGD-10) 81.7 51.5 75.1 49.9 72.7
(b) L∞ adversarial PGD(10) attacks with loss / margin at  = 8/255
Figure 2: Model accuracy on CIFAR-10 test set against var-
ious attacks. Our proposed regularizer, SCORPIO, outper-
forms prior gradient and curvature regularization methods
achieves nearly the same level of robustness as AT in all
cases.
loss surfaces, AT, SCORPIO, and CURE, the quadratic-
approximate attack performs as well or better than tradi-
tional adversarial attacks. However, for standard models
PGD attacks are superior than the quadratic-approximate at-
tack. Based on Theorem 1 we believe this is a demonstration
of the quadratic-approximate attack’s ability to exploit reg-
ularized decision boundaries which are not present in stan-
dard models.
We emphasize that although quadratic-approximate at-
tacks are not as strong as PGD against standard models,
training standard models with the proposed SCORPIO reg-
ularizer none-the-less confers strong robustness as shown
above.
Evaluating Gradient Masking
We evaluate gradient masking by following a similar evalu-
ation protocol as in (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. 2019) inspired
by (Uesato et al. 2018). Table 1 shows that our method
achieves similar adversarial accuracy on the test set when
evaluated against stronger PGD attacks. Thus increasing the
attack’s complexity does not deteriorate the adversarial ac-
curacy significantly. Furthermore, we evaluate our model
(a) CIFAR-10. (b) SVHN.
Figure 3: Comparison between adversarial risk attacks (solid
lines) and the quadratic-approximate risk attacks (dashed
lines) on CIFAR-10 (right) and SVHN (left) datasets for
varying strength L2 attacks. Quadratic approximate attacks
are slightly more successful than adversarial attacks on ro-
bust models (green, purple, blue, orange) but much less suc-
cessful against standard models (red) likely due to these
models having less regular decision boundaries.
against black box gradient-free method SimBA (Guo et al.
2019), and compared the margin computed using SimBA
and PGD for a large batch of test points in Figure 4a and
4b and observe that both methods lead to a similar adver-
sarial loss except on a very small subset of points (12 out
of 1000) for SCORPIO which improves upon the number
of red points for AT (29 out of 1000). Here, the adversarial
loss corresponds to the classification margin which captures
the confidence in correct classifications and is positive for
correct predictions and negative for misclassifications. This
further verifies that our proposed method improves the true
robustness and does not suffer from grading masking or ob-
fuscation.
Interpretability
We compare the quality of the saliency maps generated with
a variety of regularized networks, in addition to adversarial
perturbations that can serve as counterfactuals for explana-
tions. We note that standard networks produce very noisy
saliency maps, as previously noted (Etmann et al. 2019), and
the higher level of robustness a network exhibits the more
the network focuses on the object semantics as shown in Fig-
ure 5a. The counterfactual images generated in Figure 5b us-
ing (13) align better with human perception for our method
than for gradient and curvature regularized models.
Figures 6b and 6a show example images from the CIFAR-
10 test set, out of which the first three columns correspond to
correct classifications and the last two columns correspond
to misclassifications. Although saliency maps for our model
focus more on the object of interest, identify areas in the
image that most influence the predictions, and are a good
sign of lack of gradient obfuscation (Qin et al. 2019), they
cannot be directly used to reason about what features and
how would need to change to correct a misclassification or
how to justify a misclassification or a correct prediction.
(a) Adversarial Training. (b) SCORPIO.
Figure 4: Gradient masking analysis for network trained
with adversarial training PGD(10) and SCORPIO-L∞. Ad-
versarial loss here refers to the logit difference/margin (12)
and was computed with SimBA (T = 200,  = 0.2) for
the y-axis and PGD(100) at  = 8/255 for x-axis on a set
of 1000 test points. Points near the line y = x indicate
both types of attacks found similar adversarial perturbations,
while points below the line shown in red imply that SimBA
identified stronger attacks than PGD. SCORPIO exhibits a
higher resistance to gradient masking.
(a) Saliency Maps.
(b) Adversarial Perturbations.
Figure 5: Saliency maps and PGD(20) untargeted adversar-
ial attacks on the loss for sample examples from CIFAR-
10 test set. We observe that our method SCORPIO achieves
more realistic-looking adversarial perturbations and the
quality of the saliency maps improves.
To this end, we consider a framework inspired by con-
trastive explanations (Dhurandhar et al. 2019) and the ro-
bust feature manipulation by (Tsipras et al. 2019). Without
loss of generality, we consider explaining decisions of an
L2-robust network1. Our approach seeks to find pertinent
negatives/positives by optimizing over the perturbation vari-
able δ that is used to explain the prediction. Pertinent nega-
tives capture what is missing in the prediction, and pertinent
positives refer to critical features that are present in the input
examples.
Suppose we have (x, y) ∼ D, then we consider two con-
trastive explanations defined by the optimizations
δmax := argmax
δ∈B2()
l(x+ δ, y) (13)
and
δmin := argmin
δ∈B2()
l(x+ δ, y), (14)
we optimize the loss over a L2 ball of radius  to ensure that
the modified example x + δm remains close to the original
example x in both cases.
In the case of correct predictions δmax are the features
within, or that could be added to, the original image which
would flip the network’s decision to a nearby class so are
pertinent negative features of the image. Whereas, δmin are
the features which contribute to the correct prediction, mak-
ing them the pertinent positive features. In the case of incor-
rect predictions the roles are flipped. The roles are summa-
rized below.
Pred. δmax δmin
correct PP PN
incorrect PN PP
For example consider the correct prediction in column 2
of Figure 6a and 6b. The network correctly predicts the im-
age is of a ship and the pertinent positive features, δmin, are
emphasizing the mast and box of the ship. The pertinent neg-
ative features, δmax, show a nearby class for this image of a
ship is airplane, but the features that need to be added to the
original image in order to make it predict airplane are wings
and shorter tail. Part of the explanation for this ship label is
the absence of these airplane features.
For an incorrect example consider column 4 of of Figure
6a and 6b. The network incorrectly predicts the image of a
ship is an airplane. The δmax is now encoding the pertinent
positive features and we see the perturbation emphasizes a
portion at the bottom of the image which resembles landing
gear. The pertinent negative features, now δmin suggest that
the image lacks a clear distinction between the deck and hull
and between the dock and water. As the transformed image
x + δmin shows, the introduction of mast and mainsail fea-
tures would correct this error. We remark that other elements
in the image such as the sky and background are minimally
perturbed.
These contrastive explanations coupled with adversarial
learning have many potential uses such as: detect bias in
1 This can be extended to L∞ as well, as we have noticed sim-
ilar trends for robust models against L∞ adversaries.
(a) δmax Perturbations.
(b) δmin Perturbations.
Figure 6: Contrastive explanations with SCORPIO on
CIFAR-10 dataset. The perturbations were generated by
solving (14) and (13) via PGD with  = 4 and 20 steps.
training datasets, diagnose common errors made by a net-
work, or distill concepts learned by the network, to name a
few.
Conclusion
One of the most popular and effective training algorithms
for robustness is adversarial training (AT), but is computa-
tionally expensive and does not incorporate curvature infor-
mation into its attacks. We propose an approximate attack
based on the quadratic-approximation to the adversarial risk
that we show mathematically results in a worst case loss near
the optimal adversarial loss. The attack is implemented via
a Frank Wolfe iteration, which does not require projections
or additional hyperparameter tuning, and a finite difference
approximation that allows computing an effective quadratic
approximate attack in less than half the number of forward-
backward passes as AT reducing the training time. We incor-
porate these approximate attacks into a regularizer (SCOR-
PIO) and demonstrate robustness near that of AT.Further,
SCORPIO suffers from less gradient obfuscation than AT
and the quadratic-approximate attacks are shown to be as
strong as PGD attacks against regularized models. Further,
we use these robust models to develop an explanation frame-
work based on pertinent positive/negative features.
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Suplementary Material
Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. Let LA, LQ, and x be as stated in Theorem 1. Further
let vA and vQ be the corresponding adversarial and quadratic-
approximate attacks, respectively. Notice LA−LQ = `(x+vA)−
`(x) − (`(x + vQ) − `(x)). Then by Taylor’s Theorem there are
degree 3 polynomials, Rx,3(vA) and Rx,3(vQ) so that
LA − LQ = `(x+ vA)− `(x)− (`(x+ vQ)− `(x))
= Q(vA)−Q(vQ) +Rx,3(vA)−Rx,3(vQ).
Where we have suppressed the quadratic’s dependence on x, i.e.,
Q(v) := Q(v;x). Letting g = ∇x`(x) and H = ∇2x`(x) we can
write the difference of the quadratics as
Q(vA)−Q(vQ)
= 〈vA, g + 1
2
HvA〉 − 〈vQ, g + 1
2
HvQ〉
= 〈vA − vQ, g〉+ 〈vA, 1
2
HvA〉 − 〈vQ, 1
2
HvQ〉
= 〈vA − vQ, g〉+ 〈vA − vQ, 1
2
HvA〉
+ 〈vQ, 1
2
HvA〉 − 〈vQ, 1
2
HvQ〉
= 〈vA − vQ, g〉+ 〈vA − vQ, 1
2
H(vA + vQ)〉
After taking the absolute value and applying the triangle inequality
the gradient term is easily bounded with Holder, for the remaining
quadratic term
|〈vA − vQ, 1
2
H(vA + vQ)〉| ≤ 1
2
|vA − vQ|p
× (|HvQ|q + |HvA|q)
≤ 2 ‖ H ‖p,q .
Therefore,
|LM − LQ| ≤ 2|g|q + 22 ‖ H ‖p,q +|Rx,3(vA)|+ |Rx,3(vQ)|.
The bound on the remainder terms is a result of Taylor’s Theorem
Proof of Proposition 1
Assume the conditions of Proposition 1
Proof. Notice that Q(g) ≥ 1
2
gtHg ≥ 0. Let k ≥ 1 and write
vk+1 = vk + γk(sk − vk). Then since Q is quadratic it agrees
with its second order Taylor expansion about vk and so
Q(vk+1)−Q(vk) = γk∇vQ(vk) · (sk − vk)
+
(γk)2
2
(sk − vk)TH(sk − vk)
≥ γk∇vQ(vk) · (sk − vk).
The result follows by optimally of sk.
Hyperparameters
CIFAR-10. For the L2 experiments the finite difference step and
regularization strength, (h,r), used were: (1.15, 1.05) for FE(3) and
FE(1), (0.95, 0.999) and (1.25, 0.999) for CD(3) and CD(1). For the
L∞ experiments: (1.05, 1.05) and (0.95, 1.05) for FE(3) and FE(1),
(0.95, 1.15) for both CD(3) and CD(1). The learning rate was ini-
tialized at 0.01 and decayed to 0.001 after 50 epochs. Models were
trained for 60 epochs.
SVHN. We tested only FE difference schemes with N = 3 as
these were the best performers in the CIRFAR-10 experiments. The
models were trained for 40 epochs with an initial learning rate of
0.01 that decayed by a factor of 10 every 8 epochs. The best model
was chosen from all epochs. For the L2 experiments h was 1.25
and r was 0.99. For the L∞ the optimal h was 1.5 and r was 1.25.
SVHN Results
The trends seen in the CIFAR results are mirrored here in the
SVHN experiments. Table 7a and 7b show that SCORPIO outper-
forms all geometric regularization methods and is nearly as robust,
and some cases more so, than AT. We again see that untargeted
attacks are stronger than targeted and that margin are somewhat
stronger than loss attacks.
Method Clean UL TL UM TM
Standard 97.0 21.2 45.6 20.7 45.8
Gradient Reg 95.0 49.1 76.0 48.2 74.3
CURE 94.7 65.5 85.6 63.9 84.3
SCORPIO (FE,N=3) 94.0 73.7 89.1 71.3 87.7
Adv Train (PGD-10) 95.3 72.9 89.0 71.7 88.2
(a) L2 adversarial PGD(10) attacks with loss / margin at  = 0.5
Method Clean UL TL UM TM
Standard 97.0 2.4 18.8 2.4 20.5
Gradient Reg 91.4 7.8 30.7 8.1 28.8
CURE 91.6 33.5 59.9 30.9 56.1
SCORPIO (FE,N=3) 92.2 56.9 77.4 52.2 73.7
Adv Train (PGD-10) 92.8 56.4 77.0 52.5 74.2
(b) L∞ adversarial PGD(10) attacks with loss / margin at  = 8/255
Figure 7: Model accuracy on SVHN test set against various
attacks. Our proposed regularizer, SCORPIO, outperforms
prior gradient and curvature regularization methods achieves
nearly the same level of robustness as AT in all cases.
